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Abstract
The relationship between professions and the state is one of the most important issues
in the sociology of professions. Using the analysis framework of the corporate-clinical
autonomy dynamic relationship, this article delineates and analyzes the changing
relationship between the (Western) medical profession and the Chinese state since the
Republican period. Before 1949, the relationship between the growing medical
profession and the newborn state was characterized by mutual construction. Beginning
in 1949, the communist regime successfully transformed medical professionals into
members of work units. The profession was tamed and became the functionary of the
state. Although China began its reform in 1978, public healthcare institutions still
dominate the delivery of healthcare services. Practitioners are thus still dependent upon
work units. They hold dominance over both patients and medical enterprises, through
which the profession gains economic interests from the market. However, one cost is
that the profession serves as the buffer between patients and the government. Further
reform of the healthcare system should reconstruct the relationship between the
profession and the state.
Keywords: Profession, Professional autonomy, The state, Corporate autonomy, Clinical
autonomy, Dependence
Chinese urban doctors in today’s China have unique features that distinguish them
from medical professionals in other societies: their (formal) income is relatively low,
trust from patients has deteriorated, their professional image has become negative, and
even the recruitment of medical students is becoming difficult. All these predicaments
originate from doctors’ “immoral” behaviors, such as treating patients with indiffer-
ence, practicing defensive medicine, and receiving kickbacks and hongbao (red enve-
lopes containing cash). Thus, some doctors have left public healthcare institutions and
entered private practice or private hospitals. It appears that “freedom of practice” is an
effective solution for these problems.
Why do urban doctors in China constantly compromise their professional ethics to the
point that such practice becomes the norm? Why do they lack freedom of practice? What
is the relationship between their non-free practice and immoral normality? What is the
relationship between these conditions and the problems of kanbing nan (difficulty of
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consulting doctors) and kanbing gui (the high cost of consulting doctors)? All these ques-
tions refer to professional autonomy. In modern societies, professional autonomy is im-
pacted by the state because “the state has ultimate sovereignty over all” (Freidson 1970a,
24). Hence, this paper explores the changing relationship between the Chinese medical
profession and the state from the viewpoint of professional autonomy. This not only helps
us understand the underlying problems of contemporary China’s healthcare system but
also enriches theories on the relationship between professions and the state.
Professions and the state: from independence to interdependence
The sociology of professions regards doctors and lawyers as typical professions. Some
occupations are viewed as professions but others are not on the basis of the attribute
approach; certain characteristics distinguish professions from other occupations. For
example, Goode (1957) lists ten traits of established professions, of which “a prolonged
specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge, and a collectivity or service orien-
tation” are the two “core characteristics.” However, Freidson disagrees with the attri-
bute approach, arguing instead that “the only truly important and uniform criterion for
distinguishing professions from other occupations is the fact of autonomy—a position
of legitimate control over work” (Freidson 1970a, 82). Accordingly, a profession is free
from outside intervention, and its members are able to make decisions on practices on
their own. Regardless of whether external powers control the profession’s “terms of
work” such as the organization of their work and the methods of compensation for
services, this profession still holds the control over “the content of work,” namely mak-
ing decisions on diagnosis and treatment (Freidson 1970a, 339). In other words, even if
the profession loses economic and political autonomy, it will retain technological or
scientific autonomy (for medical doctors this is clinical autonomy). He declares that “so
long as a profession is free of the technical evaluation and control of other occupations
in the division of labor, its lack of control over the socioeconomic terms of work do
not significantly change its essential character as a profession” (Freidson 1970a, 25,
original emphasis).
To illustrate this assertion, Freidson (1970a) compares the medical profession in
three countries: the USA, the UK, and the Soviet Union. Medical doctors in America
enjoy both socioeconomic and technical professional autonomy because of the power-
ful American Medical Association and a less-interventional state. In Britain, the state-
established National Health Service results in a great number of medical professionals
becoming employees of the state. Although medical doctors in the Soviet Union were
confronted with a similar situation, in the UK, doctors were still allowed to open pri-
vate clinics and hospitals, and they were allowed to practice in both public and private
medical service organizations simultaneously. In contrast, in the socialist state, a med-
ical doctor “appear[s] to be almost wholly a creature of the state in that he has no
sociopolitically independence from which to stand outside the state” because any form
of private medical service institution was prohibited. Freidson claims that though physi-
cians were employees of the socialist state and practiced in public organizations, even in
the Soviet Union, they still retained a good deal of control over their work. In another
book, he claims: “Clearly, the economic and political autonomy of the medical profession
varies from country to country. What seems invariant, however, is its technological or
scientific autonomy, for everywhere the profession appears to be left fairly free to develop
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its special area of knowledge and to determine what are ‘scientifically acceptable’ practices.
… Thus, while the profession may not everywhere be free to control the terms of its work,
it is free to control the content of its work” (Freidson 1970b, 83–84). Hence, in Freidson’s
view, whether in the USA, the UK, or even the Soviet Union, a medical doctor maintains
“the right to diagnose and prescribe according to criteria that are rooted in medical know-
ledge and to have his work evaluated by colleagues, not by laymen. This is certainly the very
heart of professional autonomy” (Freidson 1970a, 43).
In fact, Freidson constructs an endogenous concept of professional autonomy (Liu
2006). His view of the relationship between the state and professions is the base of his
dichotomy of economic/political autonomy and technical autonomy. He makes clear
that professional power must be acknowledged, accepted, and granted politically as well
as socially. However, for Freidson, that is the limit of the state’s role. The state may play
a significant role in the course of establishing professions and can function as the
protector of professional monopoly, but once a profession has been established, the
state becomes no more than a tool for providing consistent support for profes-
sional domination. Ultimately, Freidson see the state as a passive agency in the
practice of established professions, even in socialist countries (1970a, 1970b, 1984,
1986, 1994, 2001).
Johnson (1972) strongly criticizes Freidson’s viewpoint and concentrates on the
relationship between professions and external powers. Differing from those before
him, Johnson treats a profession as a “means of controlling an occupation” rather
than a special occupation in itself (1972, 45). He also emphasizes that to understand
“professionalism,” one form of control must be understood—the producer-consumer
relationship that is the main source of uncertainty regarding professionalism in
modern, highly specialized societies. If a third party possesses the power of deter-
mining needs and the means to meet them, and if the third party is the state, then
this type of occupational control can be called state mediation (Johnson 1972).
Johnson turns the endogenous concept of professional power into the exogenous
one. Consequently, the role of the state receives more attention. Before Johnson, the
state was considered no more than a field, a background, a protector, or a shield that
only functioned in an extraordinarily limited way (Liu 2009). However, this presuppos-
ition of the state’s role has been effectively challenged, especially as the state increas-
ingly intervened in the healthcare system and the medical profession beginning in the
1960s and 1970s. Even in the USA, the government began to be involved in order to
guarantee equity of access and control rising costs (Starr 1982; Light 1993; Scott et al.
2000). In academia, Evans, Rueschemeye, and Skocpol’s work Bringing the State Back
In (1985) made scholars pay more attention to the role of the state in professions.
However, when bringing the state back into the study of professions, we must be
cautious about such a precondition: there is a relationship characterized by strain and
conflict between the state and professions. In other words, the more intervention from
the state, the less autonomy professions possess and vice versa. Hence, as Johnson
points out, “in the story of professionalization as an historical process, state interven-
tion is often viewed as a major impediment, explaining why certain occupations fail to
attain the full flowering of professionalism” (1995, 11). He asserts that existing studies
on the state-profession relationship are “too often constrained by analyses dependent
upon the intervention/autonomy couple” (Johnson 1982, 186).
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By reexamining the historical process of the formation of professions and state build-
ing in Britain, Johnson overrules the dichotomy between the state and professions.
Instead, he constructs an emergence thesis: “The professions are emergent as a
condition of state formation and state formation is a major condition of professional
autonomy—where such exists” (Johnson 1982, 189). Thus, he asserts that “the estab-
lishment of the jurisdictions of professions like medicine, psychiatry, law and account-
ancy, were all consequent on problems of government and, as such, were, from the
beginning of the nineteenth century at least, the product of government programmes
and policies. Far from emerging autonomously in a period of separation between state
and society, the professions were part of the process of state formation” (Johnson 1995,
11). One vital reason is that professions and the state are often dependent on each
other: not only do professions need recognition, support, and protection from the state
but so too the state “is dependent on the independence of the professions in securing
the capacity to govern as well as legitimating its governance” (Johnson 1995, 16). A
similar insight is confirmed by studies on the medical professions in Italy (Krause
1998), Britain (Larkin 1998; Klein 1990; Lewis 1998), Germany (Light 1995), and
China (Xu 2001; Liu 2009).
When studying the medical profession in the Czech Republic, Hoffman (1997) rede-
fines Freidson’s distinction of two types of autonomy into corporate and technical.
Hoffman defines corporate autonomy as “the political power of the organized profes-
sion to define the social and economic context of professional work”; technical auton-
omy signifies “the control of decision making in the workplace” (1997, 346). In her
view, clinical autonomy is not merely “a functional necessity and leads to a degree of
corporate autonomy” (1997, 347) nor are the two forms separate from one another.
Instead, the two types of professional autonomy are intertwined with each other. In the
case of the Czech Republic, Hoffman suggests that physicians’ clinical autonomy is
eroded because the socialist regime broadly and deeply affected their corporate auton-
omy and subsequently their “ability to control and direct the application of that know-
ledge” (1997, 368). Her research substantiates that corporate and clinical autonomy are
institutionally embedded in a larger structural context, and thus, the larger institutional
contexts should not be ignored when exploring professions.
Therefore, to study the relationship between the state and professions, we need to
reject the viewpoint that corporate autonomy and clinical autonomy are independent,
and the state and professions contradict each other. We must also put the relationship
into concrete historical and social contexts. The following parts analyze the changing
relationship between the Chinese urban medical profession and the state since the
Republican period.
Before 1949: the mutual construction of the profession and the state
In the Republican period, medical doctors were called “ziyou zhiye zhe” (free professionals).
This term only referred to certain occupations, including physicians, lawyers, accountants,
journalists, and professors because of certain distinguishing features. The practitioners had
to complete a professional education; they were self-organized and founded associations;
they published academic journals; they set up an education standard and licensure system;
they were relatively independent; and the majority was self-employed. In 1929, the term
“ziyou zhiye zhe” first emerged in a document of the nationalist government, indicating that
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they had become politically accepted and recognized as occupational groups (Xu 2001; Yin
2007; Zhu and Wei 2009).
At that time, doctors’ self-identity gradually became clear. In one journal published in
1929, a Western doctor, Jiang Zhenxun, commented: “Medical practice is a kind of
business indeed. But doctors do this business by scientific principles for the purpose of
prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. Therefore, medicine is different from shengye
(e.g., agriculture and fishing) and business in the narrow sense (e.g., industry, business,
and barbers that do not need higher education), which are for the purpose of interest
seeking. In fact, medicine is an academic profession” (cited in Zhu and Wei 2009, 218).
Doctors had realized that there was a clear boundary between their profession and
others.
Professional associations continued to play an increasingly important role. On behalf
of all members of the professions, these associations often negotiated with the state on
a series of healthcare-related issues. For example, in 1922, Western medical doctors
protested against the Beiyang government’s attempt to bestow the same professional
status to traditional Chinese and Western medicine. The government finally canceled
the plan (Xu 2001). Another event occurred in 1929 when the Shanghai Health Bureau
tried to adjust the high fees for their medical services; this was strongly resisted by
medical doctors. They argued that “the fee is the payment for the professional tech-
niques, rather than the ordinary business or material transactions. … It is neither
appropriate nor necessary that the government regulates doctors’ fee.” The result was a
compromise in which the Health Bureau reset the standard of doctors’ fees and raised
it slightly as well (Zhu and Wei 2009; Xu 2001).
The two cases reveal a very important fact: during the Republican period, the medical
profession enjoyed considerable professional autonomy; they could open private clinics,
negotiate service prices with the governments, and control the licensing standards.
As Xiaoqun Xu observes (2001), they represented a power that was independent
from the state. Their greater corporate autonomy was the precondition of consider-
able professional autonomy. However, the profession and the state were not always
in conflict with each other; they were usually interdependent. On the one hand,
professional power and autonomy had to be recognized and protected by the state;
on the other, the developing modern nation-state also needed support and help
from the profession.
The vital project of modern China was to save the nation from subjugation and
ensure its survival. Western scientific medicine was regarded as the necessary
means to meet this end. “Disability and the weak are social illnesses. The state
should encourage personal health, and improve people’s health conditions. Illness
and pain are the reason that the state becomes weak. Hence, the state should carry
out preventive and medical measures to ease people’s pain” (cited in Yang 2006,
97). The responsibility of managing the body gradually shifted from individuals and
families to the state in the modern era (Hwang 2006), while the state’s effective
regulation of the body had to be based on scientific medical knowledge and tech-
niques provided by the medical profession. “To ensure the survival of the state and
the nation, [we] not only protect the self by the military, but also perform con-
structions in culture. Scientific new medicine is one of the most important things”
(cited in Yang 2006, 96).
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According to Nianqun Yang’s research in the early stages of the Republic of China,
the idea that the medical profession should act in concert with the state was empha-
sized. To achieve that goal, the government established the modern healthcare system
with the help of medical professionals, by which each individual’s behavior would better
“fit the whole target set by the state” (Yang 2006, 96). Thus, mobilizing the medical
profession was an important basis and organic component of the modernization of the
national governance system. The Republican period experienced a “nationalization of
medicine.” In this course, the state intensified the supervision and intervention of
grassroots society and individuals and reconstructed urban space through founding a
modern health administrative system. This social revolution would have been impos-
sible without the involvement of the medical profession. Du Lihong’s study on the pub-
lic health system in modern Beijing reveals that as a kind of new national governance
system, the establishment of health administration would have been unsuccessful with-
out the support and participation of medical professionals (Du 2014).
At the same time, this profession also constantly sought support from the state, in-
cluding the government’s recognition of practice qualifications. Both Western medicine
and traditional Chinese medicine believed that medical practitioners should be licensed,
and only the government had the power to the license. “Only the government has the
responsibility and the power to appraise medical knowledge, and interfere in the med-
ical profession” (cited in Zhu and Wei 2009, 12). The profession clearly realized the in-
dispensable role of the state in professional life. It expected the state to support its
legitimacy and guarantee its socially legitimate professional status and professional
privileges (Xu 2001). Medical professionals still controlled the licensing standards, but
the state granted legitimacy to the profession. For instance, when the Ministry of
Health intended to forbid students who did not graduate from medical schools from
practicing medicine and give the police department the authority to register profes-
sionals, Western medical associations objected strongly. As a result, the government
compromised with the profession and allowed all practicing Western doctors to con-
tinue their practice (Zhu and Wei 2009).
Thus, as Johnson (1982) has stressed, the formation of professions and the formation
of the state are intertwined with each other, as occurred during the Republican period.
Although the medical profession and the state were often in conflict, as an emerging
modern state China was eager to take advantage of the nascent medical profession to
serve the purpose of state building (Henderson 1993; Xu 2001; Yang 2006). The emer-
ging medical profession also needed the power of the state to establish its authority
and legitimacy, thereby ensuring its high professional autonomy. In this sense, in the
Republican period, the medical profession and the state constituted a “mutually
constructed” relationship.
1949–1979: the profession was tamed by the state
The year 1949 was a turning point with the founding of the communist regime. The situ-
ation totally changed, the market was removed, and a centrally planned economy was
established. Modeling the Soviet Union (SU), the regime reconstructed the healthcare sys-
tem, and private clinics and hospitals were transformed into public institutions. The entire
medical profession was also nationalized. All independent professional associations were
disbanded. Some became semiofficial organizations and consequently lost the ability to
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negotiate with the government (Davis 2000). These formerly free professionals were no
longer free; doctors were turned into employees of the state. Moreover, as Jones points
out, in socialist countries “the significance of the state goes well beyond its status as an
employer, for the state shapes the general environment in which all occupations operate,”
including political and ideological environments, education, and all other aspects of pro-
fessional work (Jones 1991, ix). The new healthcare system constituted very different
working conditions for doctors. As a result, the medical profession lost its corporate au-
tonomy to a large extent.
The Chinese Communist Party was concerned that as experts and intellectuals,
professionals would have an inclination to break away from the masses and ignore
their needs if they held too much professional autonomy. The party needed these
professionals for socialist construction and development (Kraus 2004). Reshaping
medical professional ethics was thus necessary. In the early 1950s, the communist
regime proposed four principles to direct healthcare affairs (Sidel and Sidel 1973;
Yang 2006): (1) medicine had to serve gong-nong-bing (workers, peasants, and sol-
diers); (2) preventive medicine had to be given priority over curative medicine; (3)
TCM practitioners had to be united with practitioners of Western medicine; and,
(4) healthcare had to be integrated into mass movements. These principles, par-
ticularly the first (serve the people), became doctors’ new practical ethics.
These principles demonstrate that the new regime strived for legitimacy by pro-
viding healthcare services to the people. As Tsou Tang points out, “China’s political
system has no support from religion, so its legitimacy comes from its ability to
solve actual problems. Those governments and political systems that cannot over-
come problems will lose their legitimacy” (1994, 234). If the regime wanted to ob-
tain legitimacy, it first had to mobilize the medical professional effectively. Given
that various resources were in shortage and both economic production and people’s
lives were difficult at that time, the party had to reshape the organization of the
entire society. Accordingly, the danwei system was established. The state central-
ized all resources forcibly and then redistributed them to various sectors to achieve
modernization and meet people’s needs. Doctors were organized and managed by
work units and the government. People’s needs and professional services to meet
these needs became the objects of mediation by the state.
In the beginning of the PRC, about 80 percent of medical professionals practiced
privately. The government initially allowed them to continue practicing by indi-
vidually motivating them to serve socialist construction. However, associations of
medical practitioners were soon set up throughout the country to absorb individual
practitioners (Huang and Lin 2009b). By the end of 1965, there were approximately
44,000 doctors in private practice in the whole country; by 1983, this number had
risen to 49,148, of which 43,539 practiced in rural areas (Huang and Lin 2009a).
One can thus infer that in Mao’s era private practitioners in urban China almost
disappeared, not to mention private hospitals.
At the same time, the numbers of public healthcare institutions and doctors as work
unit members increased dramatically. In 1949, there were 3670 various medical institu-
tions, including 2600 hospitals and 769 outpatient departments (Huang and Lin 2009a).
Most were located in urban areas. In 1983 there were 66,662 hospitals operated by the
health administration and healthcare organizations, an increase of 24.6 times compared
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to 1949. Healthcare personnel from these hospitals accounted for 80 percent of all
medical professionals (Huang and Lin 2009a).
Thus, the communist regime completed the nationalization of medical doctors by
organizing them into public institutions. During the Republican period, doctors were
typically members of certain associations and thus participated in various professional
activities that connected them to other practitioners. However, after 1949, doctors
became members of a certain work unit and were fragmented. Although professional
associations (e.g., the Chinese Medical Association) survived, they were depoliticized.
In other words, these associations only functioned academically. Their other functions,
such as protecting doctors’ rights and self-regulation, were handed over to work units
and health administration.
As members of a work unit, doctors could not leave public institutions. They had to
practice in the work unit and promote the government’s regulation (Davis 2000). This
demonstrates the members’ “dependence” on the work unit, as observed by Walder
(1986); also see Henderson and Cohen 1984). According to Walder (1986), there are
two aspects of the employment relationship that define the degree of workers’ depend-
ence. “The first is the proportion of the workers’ needs satisfied (or potentially satisfied)
at the workplace. … The second aspect of dependence, just as important as the first, is
the availability of alternative sources for the satisfaction of these needs” (Walder 1986,
14–15). The first aspect means not only the satisfaction of monetary rewards but also
other social and economic needs, including “health insurance, medical care, pensions,
housing, loans, and education” (Walder 1986, 14). The second (alternative) refers to
“the availability of employment elsewhere on comparable terms. ‘Availability’ implies
not only the existence of other job (something that depends on labor market condi-
tions), but also the absence of legal or political barriers that close off these alternatives”
(Walder 1986, 14–15). Moreover, “alternatives” also signify “the availability of outside
income or alternative sources for the satisfaction of nonwage needs: pensions, health
insurance, housing, loans, and so forth” (Walder 1986, 15).
Through this framework, we can infer that doctors in Mao’s era were able to practice
only after entering public healthcare institutions. Moreover, the government deter-
mined their service fee, income, medical equipment, and even their patients. In
addition, given that all resources were controlled and distributed by the state, it
was impossible for doctors to leave the work unit; in that case, they not only
would not be permitted to practice but also would not survive. Therefore, from
1949 to 1979, the majority of doctors were largely dependent on public institutions
and the state.
Besides transforming professionals into state employees, the regime successfully
produced more doctors by reconstructing medical education. Again modeling the SU,
the Chinese government carried out a radical reform of medical education. First, the
state shortened the curriculum. Some medical schools (e.g., Peking Union Medical
College) were permitted to maintain their extensive education system because their
main task was defined as training teachers and researchers. Meanwhile, the government
founded many medical schools that provided five-year and even three-year medical training
(Sidel and Sidel 1973). During the Cultural Revolution, medical education was decentra-
lized, which broadened the disparity in medical education between provinces (Sidel and
Sidel 1973). Second, medical education was divided into several specific parts, including
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pediatrics, public health, stomatology, and pharmacy. These revolutionary measures pro-
vided high numbers of health personnel in a short time and relieved the shortage of medical
professionals to some extent. However, in this process, the state deprived doctors of their
corporate autonomy in professional education and admittance.
The lack of corporate autonomy had a negative influence on doctors’ clinical auton-
omy in at least three aspects. First, the state distributed few resources to medicine and
healthcare because healthcare was a nonproduction department, ranking at the bottom
of the planned economy. Deficiencies in infrastructure and medical equipment limited
doctors’ diagnosis and treatment. Second, doctors strictly controlled laborers’ sick leave
because they had to serve the state’s interests and ensure socialist production. Third,
the state’s intervention in medical education directly affected students’ learning.
However, doctors’ dependence on public institutions is only one side of the relationship
between the state and the profession. The other is that as employees of the state, doctors
possessed bureaucratic power. Doctors in the SU were “the hybrid profession”; although
they had no corporate autonomy, they became a bureaucratic profession and gained a
path to power (Field 1988, 1991, 1993). The medical profession’s power usually comes
from its esoteric knowledge and patients’ emotional attachment (Starr 1982); but in so-
cialist states, including China, the medical profession also had bureaucratic power because
it became “a state functionary” (Field 1991, 54). Research on the medical profession in the
Czech Republic also reaches a similar conclusion (Heitlinger 1991, 1993, 1995). As Hei-
tlinger points out, “Socialist medicine was dependent on the state for financing, provision
of workplace, medical supplies and technology, clientele, salaries, the license to practice,
and an adequate supply of subordinate health workers. The party-state decreed by fiscal
and legislative or administrative means the organizational framework of health services
and who should receive them and in what order of priority” (Heitlinger 1993, 175).
However, individual practitioners “were usually left free to choose how to treat their
patients and how to practice their particular medical specialty” (Heitlinger 1993, 175).
Compared with their counterparts in Western societies, Czech physicians enjoyed more
clinical power and professional authority over patients because of their status as civil ser-
vants (Heitlinger 1995). Chinese doctors may be in the same situation. To summarize, in
the Mao’s era, through socialist reforms, Chinese urban medical profession became
controlled by the state and lost corporate autonomy. It is a process that doctors
were taming (Field 1988, 1991, 1993). All practitioners were turned to the state’s
employees. They were banned to practice privately and were dependent on work
units and the state. But meanwhile, in addition to professional authority, medical
professionals also gained bureaucratic power because doctors became “a state func-
tionary.” They were operators of social control as well as gatekeepers of scarce
medical resources. However, doctors generally prioritized the state’s interests rather
than patients’ interests. As a result, these state-employed medical professionals can
be viewed as “an extension of state governance” (Johnson 1995). Some scholars
even argue that Chinese doctors in Mao’s era underwent deprofessionalization
(Sidel and Sidel 1973).
After 1979: the profession becomes the buffer for the state
This last part analyzes the fact that from 1949 to 1979 Chinese urban doctors were
highly dependent on public healthcare institutions. With the reform and opening-up,
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China began to move away from the “classic socialist model” (Kornai 1992). Thus, the
relationship between the medical profession and the country changed again.
Abnormal marketization of the healthcare system
At the end of the 1970s, the state initiated reforms in the healthcare delivery system,
and the main terms of work for doctors (Blumenthal and Hsiao 2005; Henderson
1993;Ge et al. 2007; Gu et al. 2006; Zhou 2008). The reforms can be summarized in
two aspects: “zi fu yingkui” (to self-finance) and “fangquan rangli” (to grant power and
concede interests). In other words, the government gave “public hospitals policy with-
out financial support.” In a 1979 interview with a journalist from Xinhua News Agency,
Vice Minister of Health Xinzhong Qian proposed managing “health services by using
economic measures.” He also noted: “We must work according to objective economic
laws and tentatively manage medical institutions as we manage enterprises. We have to
entitle them with the power to determine their own expenditure, accounting, equip-
ment purchasing, professional ranking promotion, and rewarding or punishing through
performance evaluation” (Xinhua News Agency 1979).
As a result, financial support from the government was shrinking in the income
structure of public hospitals. This meant that the state successfully relieved its financial
burden in providing healthcare services to its people. According to available statistics,
state financial support accounted for about 60 percent of an average hospital’s income
at the beginning of 1980s, which was not long after the implementation of the reform.
This rate steadily declined and fell to below 10 percent in 2003 (Sun et al. 2008). In
recent decades, this proportion has constantly been around 7 percent of the total.
Table 1 shows each public hospital’s average income from 1998 to 2011. The financial
support that each hospital received from the government was fairly stable during these
years. The minor decline in the income proportion of selling pharmaceutical products
does not indicate that the government increased its financial support to public
Table 1 Average income of public general hospitals, 1998–2011 (10,000 RMB)
Year State financial
support
Percent Medical service Percent Pharmacy Percent Other Percent Total
1998 155.4 5.99 990.9 38.19 1199.1 46.21 137.6 5.30 2594.7
1999 194.6 6.81 1205.2 42.16 1337.3 46.79 87.4 3.06 2858.3
2000 204.1 6.29 1413.1 43.58 1500.6 46.28 96.9 2.99 3242.4
2001 251.6 7.11 1562.3 44.16 1602.6 45.30 93.8 2.65 3537.9
2002 273 7.35 1684.1 45.33 1616.2 43.50 92.5 2.49 3715.1
2003 297.5 7.49 1827.7 46.04 1773.8 44.69 100.2 2.52 3969.4
2004 318.2 6.22 2296 44.92 2045.7 40.02 103.5 2.02 5111.8
2005 333.3 5.98 2685.7 48.17 2383.6 42.75 105.6 1.89 5575.6
2006 393.6 6.39 3045.8 49.41 2559.4 41.52 107.7 1.75 6163.8
2007 523.4 6.97 3713.9 49.48 3127.6 41.67 113.6 1.51 7506.5
2008 646.9 6.97 4545.4 48.96 3924.5 42.28 144.8 1.56 9283.1
2009 850.2 7.40 5590.3 48.63 4846.8 42.16 170.9 1.49 11494.9
2010 997.8 7.18 6868.1 49.39 5824.9 41.89 189.9 1.37 13,906.1
2011 1313.2 7.76 8519.0 50.36 6817.3 40.30 231.6 1.37 16,916.5
Source: Ministry of Health of PRC 2003, 2010, 2012. The total percentage of all incomes in the original data does not total
100 percent; this table reflects that fact
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hospitals; rather, this should be understood as a significant increase in the income from
medical services. Medical professionals had to constantly balance economic interests,
efficiency, and patients’ interests while providing healthcare services. The reemergence
of “the cash nexus” (Field 1991) between doctors and patients was buried below fore-
shadowing of the erosion of clinical autonomy and the conflicts between practitioners
and patients.
The medical profession continued its dependence on public healthcare institutions
because the state still monopolized the provision of healthcare services. In 1980, the
State Council published an official document that allowed medical doctors to practice
individually, legitimizing private practice. The 1998 Law on Practicing Doctors also
legitimized private clinical practitioners. Moreover, the central government issued a
series of policies to encourage the development of nonpublic healthcare institutions.
However, doctors practicing in private clinics and nonpublic hospitals were still small
in number (Zhou 2008; Gu et al. 2006; Gu 2011; Ding and Ge 2008). As shown in
Table 2, although private hospitals accounted for 40.24 percent of all hospitals in 2013,
public hospitals held 84.42 percent of all beds and 86.76 percent of all health personnel.
In addition, public hospitals provided 89.78 percent of all outpatient services and 87.92
percent of all inpatient services. By 2011, 85.19 percent of all health personnel and
82.80 percent of all practicing doctors worked in public healthcare institutions
(Ministry of Health of PRC 2012). To date, public organizations still dominate the
healthcare sector, maintaining the status of the majority of doctors as state employees.
Private hospitals not only enjoy a minor market share of healthcare services but are
also restricted by current policies in taxation, medical device equipment, qualifications
of health insurance-appointed hospitals, medical research, and occupational opportun-
ities for doctors. As a result, it is difficult for private hospitals to compete with public
hospitals, and thus private hospitals can attract few practitioners (Zhou 2008). This
decreases the possibility that medical professionals can practice outside public hospitals,
which increases the degree of dependence on public healthcare institutions.
The government not only excludes doctors’ possibilities of private practice but also
sets up a number of institutional arrangements to restrain doctors from occupational
mobility, whether between different public institutions or between public and private
institutions. The majority of medical doctors hold shiye bianzhi (established posts in
the public service unit), approximately equal to “iron rice bowls.” Therefore, in public
institutions, the employment relationship is extremely different from that in capitalist
enterprises. As Walder points out: “employment does not fluctuate according to the
Table 2 The comparison of public and private hospitals nationwide, 2013
Public Percent Private Percent Total
Number 13,396 54.22 11,313 45.78 24,709
Beds 3,865,385 84.42 713,216 15.58 4,578,601
Hospital personnel (10,000) 460.6 85.76 76.4 14.22 537.1
Health personnel (10,000) 383.9 86.76 58.6 13.24 442.5
Outpatients (100,000,000) 24.6 89.78 2.9 10.58 27.4
Inpatients (10,000) 12,315 87.92 1692 12.08 14,007
Source: National Health and Family Planning Commission 2014. The total number of outpatients do not equal the
number of public hospitals added to the number of private hospitals. The same problem also occurs in the number of
inpatients. The statistical report has the same problem
Yao The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2016) 3:2 Page 11 of 17
firm’s demand for labor, nor does the firm’s demand fluctuate with changes in demand
for its products” (1986, 11).
Apart from these personnel systems for all employees in the public service unit, med-
ical doctors are also constrained by a special institutional arrangement: the dingdian
zhiye (fixed-point practice) system. In China, a medical student becomes a medical doc-
tor by meeting three conditions. The student must (1) receive a professional education
and graduate from a medical school; (2) pass the national examination of practitioner
qualification and receive a certificate for practice; and (3) register with a certain medical
institution. Only then is the student (or the doctor) able to practice in a registered hos-
pital, but only in that particular hospital; it would otherwise be illegal. The last condi-
tion thus ties individual doctors to a certain healthcare institution. In recent years, the
government moved to facilitate the “reasonable mobility” of medical doctors and
encourage them to practice in several institutions. On March 1, 2011, the Tentative
Measures of Practitioners’ Practicing in Several Points (Beijingshi Yishi Duodian Zhiye
Guanli Banfa (Shixing)) was implemented in Beijing by the Municipal Health Bureau.
At that point, only the physician-in-charge or higher-ranking doctors could apply to
practice at three other medical institutions within the city. The conditions are that
applicants have to be ranked as physician-in-charge or higher; all their practicing loca-
tions are within Beijing; and applicants should first finish their duties at their current
institution. Thus, this new allowance to practice in more than one institution appears
to be only a trivial improvement for most practitioners.1 A few doctors left public hos-
pitals, but this did not reduce the profession’s dependence on public institutions. As a
result, some media has advocated the liberation of doctors (e.g., Liu 2013).
To sum up, abnormal marketization of the health sector has led to two contradictory
consequences: on the one hand, to a large extent, the government has reduced financial
support for public healthcare institutions, which required doctors to always consider
service efficiency and economic interests. On the other hand, the government still
monopolizes the delivery of healthcare services. As a result, the majority of medical
practitioners have to maintain their status as state employees who are dependent on
public institutions and cannot exit these organizations (Hirschman 1970).
Becoming the buffer of the system
The medical profession still has no independent associations. To date, there are two
main professional organizations: the Chinese Medical Association and the Chinese
Medical Doctor Association. Neither controls admission of doctors; this important
function, the essential element of corporate autonomy, is carried out by health adminis-
trations. As previously noted, the Chinese Medical Association principally played an
academic role after 1949. The Chinese Medical Doctor Association was founded in
2002. This association claims to protect doctors’ rights, but it only makes appeals with-
out substantial effect. It also claims to supervise doctors’ practices, but the Ministry of
Health actually issued a series of rules to regulate doctors’ “immoral” practices rather
than the association.2 All the facts demonstrate that Chinese doctors still lack a profes-
sional association to regulate themselves and protect their rights.
Thus, contemporary Chinese urban doctors still lack corporate autonomy. As a re-
sult, this profession does not hold the power to control the price of healthcare services,
pharmacy, and medical materials. Moreover, their labor price is extremely low due to
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the state’s intervention (Zhou 2008). The Chinese government’s price control for med-
ical services is seen as a method of guaranteeing the availability of basic medical ser-
vices for the general public (Liu et al. 2000; Meng et al. 2002; Ge et al. 2002; Sun et al.
2008). According to a study by Renwei Ge and his colleagues (Ge et al. 2002:44), this
policy originated from policy makers. In the eyes of these policy makers, the lower the
price, the more likely that the patient’s interests would be addressed. Therefore, the
state tightly controlled the service fee standards for each medical service to ensure that
all individuals could access healthcare services regardless of their economic conditions.
This inevitably distorts the value of doctors as well as drugs and medical materials
(Zhu 2007, 2011; Blumenthal and Hsiao 2015). However, the medical profession is
incapable of taking any collective action and negotiating price control policy with the
government because they lack corporate autonomy.
Because of the lack of corporate autonomy, the profession is unable to realize effect-
ive peer supervision and self-regulation. Furthermore, these conditions erode doctors’
clinical autonomy. Although the profession lacks corporate autonomy and enjoys some
bureaucratic power both before and after the reform, the reasons that their clinical
autonomy eroded are different. First, erosion of clinical autonomy due to shortage of
medical equipment rarely occurred after the reform. The majority of urban doctors
now have sufficient equipment. Second, there has been considerable progress in med-
ical education, which makes doctors master more medical knowledge. These develop-
ments increase doctors’ clinical autonomy. Third, however, doctors still have to take
nonclinical considerations into account in their practices. These nonclinical consider-
ations changed from political to economic factors originating from the abnormal
marketization of the healthcare sector. This abnormal marketization forced public hos-
pitals to raise economic interests to survive. Each department and each doctor of the
hospital must deal with the organizational pressure; this constitutes the main cause of
the erosion of clinical autonomy because practitioners have to consider economic inter-
ests of both the institution and themselves when they are practicing.
Moreover, the profession’s clinical autonomy is further eroded because doctors have
bureaucratic power. I have indicated that private healthcare institutions are still unable
to compete effectively with public ones. Most quality medical resources, including med-
ical equipment and health personnel, are attached to public hospitals. A 2007 survey
showed that even though only 51.3 percent of respondents were satisfied with the ser-
vices provided by public hospitals and 52.5 percent recognized that services delivered
by state-owned hospitals fell far below their expectations, up to 94 percent still selected
state-owned hospitals as their first choice for medical services (Sun et al. 2007). Lim et
al. (2004) present similar findings in their research on public perceptions of private
healthcare services in Guangdong, Shanxi, and Sichuan. Thus, patients’ reliance on the
public healthcare sector has helped maintain public hospitals’ domination over its
clients.
This leads to public hospitals’ monopoly of the terminal sale of drug and medical mate-
rials. Take drugs as an example. In the revenue generated through retail sales of all drugs,
prescription drugs account for 75–80 percent (Zhu 2007, 2011). Different from nonpre-
scription drugs (i.e., OTC), prescription drugs can only be provided to patients by practicing
doctors, the majority of whom are working in public hospitals. In other words, the prescrib-
ing and dispensing of drugs is not separated (Li 2010). Consequently, public hospitals nearly
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monopolize drug sales and have influence over pharmaceutical companies. Public hospitals
thus occupy a significantly advantageous position in their interactions with both patients
and pharmaceutical companies. Patients and pharmaceutical companies lack the power to
negotiate with public hospitals and their doctors (Zhu 2007).
Public hospitals thus enjoy a dual domination: public hospitals tightly restrict pa-
tients’ choices in utilization of healthcare services (although patients have remarkable
freedom to make choices between different public hospitals); in addition, public hospi-
tals occupy an advantageous position in regard to pharmaceutical companies. With this
dual domination, practitioners simply convert their legitimate monopoly of prescrip-
tions to economic interests. Informal payments (Kornai and Eggleston 2001; Ensor
2004; Bloom et al. 2001), including kickbacks and hongbao, clearly reflect the dual
domination that doctors hold. Hence doctors always compromise their professional
ethics during practice because they are unable to make decisions based only on medical
knowledge; they have to consider economic interests as well. That’s why there always
exist induced demands, over-description, and medical representatives (yiyao daibiao) in
contemporary China. Ultimately, the problem fact that it is difficult and expensive to
consult doctors occurs.
Ironically, this dependence on public hospitals and the state is the source of doctors’
dual domination. In my view, the bureaucratic power of doctors during the reform was
the primary means of the dual domination. The medical profession was able to com-
pensate for their huge economic losses due to the state’s price control through trans-
forming the monopoly on prescriptions into economic interests. In this situation,
doctors lack corporate autonomy, and their clinical autonomy is eroded. However, they
also bear enormous costs: their public image has been badly tarnished, they have lost
their patients’ trust, and even their lives are constantly under threat. In this sense, the
entire medical profession has become an institutional buffer for the problematic health-
care system, and individual medical professionals have become the scapegoat for the
entire profession.
Conclusion: the dynamic relationship between the medical profession and
the state
This paper analyzes the changing relationship between the medical profession and the
state and its causes. In the Republican period, most medical doctors were self-
employed. They founded professional associations to deal with various affairs. Their
corporate autonomy ensured that they were able to resist intervention from the new
modern state. The profession and the state mutually constructed each other: the state
strived to solve national crises and control people with the help of the medical profes-
sion, while the profession tried to gain legitimate monopoly of healthcare services with
support from the state.
After 1949, the communist Chinese state became stronger, and the new regime
gained control of the medical profession. Through nationalization of the profession in
which most doctors were organized into public healthcare institutions and became
members of work units, the power of medical doctors was curbed by the state. Doctors
were transformed into gatekeepers of scarce medical resources and social controllers.
At the same time, the professionals achieved some bureaucratic power. However, the
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profession’s corporate autonomy was decreased, and consequently, their clinical auton-
omy was deeply eroded.
By the end of the 1970s, China instigated its reform, and the state began to selectively
retreat from the healthcare sector. This sector was then marketized abnormally: on the
one hand, public hospitals were forced to be financially self-reliant, while on the other
hand, the government still monopolized healthcare provision. The medical profession
still lacks corporate autonomy. The majority of practicing doctors are still dependent
on public healthcare institutions; the so-called professional associations are unable to
protect rights and self-regulate. As a result, doctors have to accept the terms of work
arranged by the state. Under the organizational pressure emphasizing service efficiency
and economic interests, doctors are incapable of diagnosing and treating by profes-
sional knowledge alone, and their clinical autonomy has been eroded. This erosion is
intensified by doctors’ dual domination over both patients and pharmaceutical compan-
ies. Through dual domination, they easily convert their monopoly of prescriptions into
economic interests. They thus compensate for their heavy economic losses due to the
state’s price control of services and wages. However, the erosion of clinical autonomy
and unethical practices are the origin of this conversion; the lack corporate autonomy
is the origin of unethical practices. In this process, medical doctors have paid consider-
able costs—they have become the scapegoat and buffer of the problematic healthcare
system and the state.
The case of the Chinese medical profession demonstrates that denying the dichotomy
of corporate and clinical autonomy is necessary to understanding the relationship be-
tween the state and the profession. When examining the relationship between profes-
sions and the state in specific historical and social context, we soon find that clinical
autonomy may be eroded. The loss of corporate autonomy definitely influences clinical
autonomy, but we should consider the political, economic, and social contexts under
which professionals practice since how corporate autonomy influences clinical auton-
omy depends on the specific political-economic system and institutional arrangements.
Clinical medicine is a highly professionalized occupation. A lay person or even the
state cannot supervise practitioners effectively. The only individuals who can effectively
supervise may be the practitioners themselves. Self-regulation of the profession is com-
mon around the world. In other words, the medical profession should be endowed with
corporate autonomy. It may then be possible for the profession to supervise practi-
tioners. Reconstructing the relationship between the profession and the state and creat-
ing a self-regulating professional association should be the methods for changing the
negative situation of the medical profession that currently exists in China.
Endnotes
1According to Yan (2014), by November 2013, there were a total of 1355 practicing
doctors who registered a several-point practice. Their professional rank was physician-
in-charge or higher. By 2011, there were 43,952 practicing doctors in Beijing (Ministry
of Health 2012). Therefore, the number of doctors registering a several-point practice
only accounted for approximately 3 % of the total.
2For instance, according to my own statistics, since 1988, the Ministry of Health
has issued at least 14 documents, suggestions, and measures against doctors receiving
hongbao.
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